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Slovakia – a comparative analysis from a longue durée 
perspective
István Kollai
Department of World Economy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Introduction
The birth of this essay was inspired by a series of long-maturing personal impressions 
which the article attempts to form into the subject of an in-depth research, aiming to 
make them appropriate for further academic inquiry. Thus, the scientific credibility of 
the topic discussed below might be not impaired by a confession that a multitude of 
impressions shaped the hypothesis which serves as a starting point for investigation. 
This hypothesis consists of two theorems: (a) Hungarian public life is much more 
politicized and ideologically divided/bipolarized than Slovak public life; (b) this kind of 
polarization and politicization can partially be traced back to twentieth-century history, 
which evoked more value choice dilemmas within Hungarian society than within Slovak 
society (the idioms applied here will be described below). With a bit of simplification, 
the dilemma in question can be decoded as a traditionalist-modernist value conflict, 
exacerbated and augmented within Hungarian political culture by several historical 
situations arising from twentieth-century history, meanwhile largely revoked and neu-
tralized by the same historical situations within Slovak political culture. Eventually, the 
two societies have evolved into nations with quite different attitudes (at least from this 
aspect): a sort of unconcern or phlegmatic attitude has emerged within Slovak political 
culture towards political ideologies, while Hungarian political culture tends to immerse 
itself in such issues.
In order to examine these assumptions as thoroughly as possible, the degree of 
politicization and bipolarization/dividedness of public life must first be somehow made 
visible, perhaps even measurable; the first section of this study attempts to do so. It is 
followed by the examination of four historical situations of the twentieth century, 
affecting Hungarian and Slovak society similarly deeply (but in different ways): i.e. the 
political crises during the late decades of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the post- 
world war 1 peace settlements, the process of interwar urbanization, and the attempt of 
Communism to transform societies. Finally, the different effect of these historical situa-
tions on contemporary political cultures is elucidated. Such a research approach 
assumes the prevalence of path-dependent development, i.e. that past political, social, 
or economic trends reinforce themselves and hence influence today’s state of society. 
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As a general theorem within social sciences, this approach has emerged in quite 
different disciplines. The longue durée approach formulated by the Annales School 
attempts to elucidate the importance of institutional inertia in historical research 
(Braudel and Wallerstein 2009). In sociology, even concepts criticizing unilineal evolu-
tionary theories and emphasizing ability of individuals to be “institutional entrepre-
neurs” or “agents of change,” do not disregard the power of inertia of institutions 
(customs, norms, rules) (e.g. structuration theory; Giddens 1984). Similarly, the theory 
of path dependence is a highly acclaimed concept in economics, which emerged 
partially from development theories, and was coined by such renowned thinkers as 
the Nobel Prize-winner Gunnar Myrdal (Myrdal 1957). The philosopher Karl Popper, who 
was extremely fierce in criticizing historicism as a harmful belief in the calculable and 
unilinear development of societies, acknowledged the possibility of certain soft trends, 
and the logic of causalities (Popper 1957). Last but not least, political science is also 
liable to argue that attitudes determining political culture are prone to reinforce 
themselves (Downs 1957).
Politicization and polarization of the public sphere in Slovakia and Hungary
The ambition of scrutinizing the degree of politicization within the public sphere is 
seriously challenged by the fluid, overlapping and contentious definitional attempts 
regarding these terms. Academic literature offers a plethora of definitions and models 
whose comprehensive overview (see e.g. Cohen and Arato 1992) exceeds the scope of this 
paper. Nevertheless, some sense of what “politicization of the public sphere” implies can 
be derived even from contradictory concepts. In his seminal work, Jürgen Habermas 
defined the public sphere (die Öffentlichkeit) as the agora of politically critical sense, 
playing a crucial role in forming and controlling political decisions. This ability to assist 
and control political decision-making is opposed here to publicity (die Publizität), which is 
hollowed out and manipulated by market forces or state structures (Habermas 1997; for 
an analysis, see Cohen and Arato 1992; Nanz 2018). In a Habermasian interpretation, the 
“political public sphere” is a desirable state which should be restored by the re-politiciza-
tion of the public sphere (Cohen and Arato 1992). A somewhat different connotation of 
politicization can be depicted when the “political sphere” and “civil sphere” are defined as 
sub-clusters of the public sphere. In this case, the public sphere can be defined very 
broadly as the platform of public communication, as “the abstract space in which citizens 
discuss and debate public issues,” attaching a rather wide and neutral interpretation to 
this expression (Oliver and Myers 1999). Within this broad agora of “open-ended and 
public-spirited communication” (Baiocchi 2003), the civil sphere can be conceived as “a 
solidary sphere in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes to be culturally 
defined and to some degree institutionally enforced” (Alexander 2006, 31), as the domain 
of volunteer-based cooperation of citizens, a cooperative space of communities within 
society. Meanwhile, the “political sphere” can be interpreted from this perspective as a 
field of struggle, der Kampf, as put simply by Max Weber (Palonen 2003). However, 
different the (Weberian) combative and (Habermasian) constructively critical senses of a 
politicized public sphere seem to be, their connecting thread is the covering of activities 
which imply decisions concerning contested ideational issues. Decision is a fundamental 
component of a politicized public sphere in both aspects: the politicization of the public 
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sphere is a state when public activities – initiatives, statements, discourses – implicitly 
entail or explicitly indicate decisions and choices between ideas.
But how can we “measure” the level of politicization, if possible? If we are discussing a 
primarily qualitative phenomenon, we ought to rely on the analysis of descriptive sources. 
However, it seems to be worth attempting to provide quantitative data, through the 
comparative scrutiny of local (municipal) elections, which can be regarded as the domain 
of confluence of the political and civil sphere. In municipal elections, party candidates – 
representing great ideological schemes – duel with bottom-up organized local civil 
candidates, representing typically non-political themes as independent candidates with-
out the officially recognized support of any political party.1 This provides us with the 
capability of measuring the weight of non-political candidates (Hungary: “független 
jelölt,” Slovakia: “nezávisly kandidát” or “NEKA”) against political ones. However, the 
official labels of candidates can be misleading: it is a well-known election practice to 
run for a political position with the strong support of several political forces, but not using 
their logos. This non-official support is supposed to be fruitful when candidates’ person-
alities seem to be more popular than their proponents from high politics. The opposite 
can also occur, when civil activists appear on the election lists of political parties. It is not 
just a methodological problem, as it ushers in the dilemma of whether we can speak 
about a real civil presence within the platform of any political elections? Some argue that 
real NGO-activists have nothing in common with “high politics,” and that running for a 
political position means giving-up civil ideas. From this perspective, the term “civil 
candidate” is an oxymoron, and candidates with an NGO background are likely to be 
considered “traitors” to their chosen profession.2
These reservations notwithstanding, an assumption can be made that comparing the 
presence of successful party and non-party candidates in local elections can approximate 
the depth of politicization of the public sphere, when citizens have the possibility of 
opting for either civil (non-political) or political narratives. When scrutinizing the 
Hungarian and Slovakian municipal election results through a structured breakdown, a 
significant difference can be detected. In Hungary, a cluster of independent mayors 
consists primarily of leaders of rural small towns and villages, meanwhile cities with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants – particularly county towns and county centres – remain 
the domain of high-political representatives. In contrast, a strong civil presence can be 
observed in Slovakia on this level, i.e. among municipal council members and mayors of 
bigger cities (see Table 1).
The apparent difference unfolded in local election statistics becomes more vigorous 
when attempting to disregard pseudo-independent candidates, who are supported by 
non-recognized high-political proponent organizations, i.e parties or their informal coali-
tions. In 2019, numerous Hungarian city council candidates were appointed by an 
inaccessible broad anti-government party coalition, ranging from ex-far right to radical 
left, which did not seem to allow the possibility of gaining credibility through overt 
political communication. Meanwhile in Slovakia, the actual independence of NEKA- 
mayors and council members can be confirmed through campaign situations when 
they had to contend with both government and opposition party candidates, or through 
their post-election positioning and behaviour, when independently elected council mem-
bers did not join any council faction. Seeing the general popularity of such candidates, a 
conclusion can be reached that “Slovak voters at municipal level favours (sic) independent 
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candidates or authorities distanced themselves from party politics.” (Horváth and Šebík 
2015, 105). And, in contrast, local election results show that the public sphere is more 
politicized in Hungary than in Slovakia: more public activities – including the supply side 
(representation of public personalities) and demand side (voters’ behaviour) – imply 
ideological decisions and commitments between conflicting values.
The deep politicization of the Hungarian public sphere does not necessarily 
mean its dividedness or bipolarization as well; and from some aspects – e.g. 
from the aspect of the proportion of voters who defined themselves as radicals3 
– neither Hungarian nor Slovakian political culture is extraordinarily polarized. 
Yet, political sociology argues that a bi-polar left-right “bloc mentality” has been 
proved to be rather predominant and antagonistic after the fall of Communism 
in Hungary (Tóka 2005; Körösényi 2012).4 This has been confirmed by the fact 
that since the fall of Communism, eight governments have already been estab-
lished in Hungary, and all of them have been formed purely by right-wing or by 
left-liberal forces. Such a bipolarization, symbolized and reinterpreted through 
value conflicts, does not mean that parties follow strong ideological pro-
grammes, as substances of their voters’ group interests (Illés and Körösényi). 
For this reason, it seems to be more appropriate to speak about dividing value 
conflicts, serving as a discursive formation, and not about ideological cleavages 
of group interests (Karácsony 2001). The depth of this bipolarized value conflict 
is revealed by an interesting research project which shows that Hungarian 
voters, if their parties are in opposition, become distrustful towards Hungarian 
public institutions as a whole. This relation between political satisfaction and 
public trust proved to be one of the strongest within the EU, while the same 
link is apparently weak in Slovakia (Patkós 2019).
Indeed, Slovakia produces the opposite of the above-outlined Hungarian tendency: the 
country has been governed by “rainbow coalitions” – binding together political parties 
from contesting ideological backgrounds (Bakke and Sitter 2005) – several times already, 
while this has remained an unknown phenomenon in Hungary. In Slovakia, a broad 
rainbow coalition was formed in 1998 by alliances belonging to left, liberal, centrist, 
and conservative party families, and this coalition succeeded in being partially re-elected 
in 2002 (Staroňová and Malíková 2003).5 In 2010, a similar rainbow coalition was con-
structed again; however, it lasted just 2 years. The 2016–2020 government was also 
Table 1.. Eight of non-party candidates within local governance (Slovakia and Hungary).
Ratio of non-party candidates
Recent term 
(SK: 2018-(HU: 2019-
Past term 
(SK: 2014–2018) 
(HU: 2014–2019)
Capital city council members (SK) 37.8 % (17/45) 26.7% (12/45)
Capital city council members (HU) 6.1% (2/33) 0% (0/33)
District mayors in capital city (SK) 58.8% (10/17) 47.1% (8/17)
District mayors in capital city (HU) 8.7% (2/23) 0% (0/23)
Mayors of county centres (SK) 62.5% (5/8) 50% (4/8)
Mayors of county centres (HU) 15.8% (3/19) 0% (0/19)
City council members of country centres (SK) 58.3% (155/266) 50.9% (115/266)
City council members of country centres (HU) 18% (65/362)
Own calculations. Data on Slovakian local elections: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, www.statistics.sk. 
Data on Hungarian local elections: National Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu.
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formed by three parties which belong to three different factions in the European 
Parliament.6 This elucidates that voters did not demand strong ideological commitment 
from their preferred parties and that they – at least generally – did not punish the 
preferred parties for going into coalition with representatives of contradicting ideologies.
Finally, some striking differences can be pointed out in the field of journalism as well, 
even when it is more than challenging to detect and measure the weight of politically 
oriented content in this level. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that there have been 
influential political mediums in Slovakia which have served as melting pots for different 
ideological strands: the most influential political daily SME [We are] is considered by its 
former editor-in-chief (1999–2006) Martin M. Šimečka as a journal drifting somewhere 
from the “liberal centre” to a right-wing attitude with high sensitivity on human rights and 
minority issues, and he positions most Slovakian journals within a conservative-liberal 
spectrum.7 The leading political weekly týždeň [week] could also be positioned similarly, 
particularly before the 2015 split of the editorial board.8 Meanwhile in Hungary, at least 
until recent times, attempts to establish centrist media portfolios have not met a market 
demand – i.e. a public demand. A direct experiment for launching such a centrist or 
“rainbow” political journal was the re-organization of the daily Magyar Hírlap in 2005, 
targeting a centrist audience. After having encountered market failures, the portfolio’s 
new owner enforced it to shift towards the radical-right steppes of Hungarian publicity.9 
Similarly, unsuccessful was the initiative of renowned journalist Gergely Dudás ex-editor 
in chief of the most influential news portal Index.hu, who in 2017 struggled to launch a 
massive Indiegogo campaign for establishing new, politically independent media. The 
campaign envisaged a media platform which bridged ideological cleavages. Eventually, it 
ended with a spectacular failure, having gathered around 12% of the targeted foundation 
capital.10
Meanwhile, the political centre has been seemingly hollowed out in Hungary, it is 
intrinsically challenging to reveal what is on the two edges: what “left” and “right” covers. 
It cannot be stated that it conceals different economic orientations or a strikingly distinct 
positioning of the society within Europe: “catching up with the West” – at least in terms of 
economic power and wealth – has prevailed as a universal moral imperative throughout 
various ages of modern Hungarian history until recent years (Ágh 2019), when the rhetoric 
of some anti-Western neo-traditionalist streams has become increasingly influential. The 
difference can be found rather on the layer of political psychology, where a collectivist 
and an individualist idea of emancipatory development persist. The leftish-liberal tradition 
in Hungary implies a strong Rawlsian commitment to individual emancipation, a devel-
opmental path through the fulfilment of individual prosperity. This leftish-liberal conflu-
ence is rooted partially in post-1956 Reform Communism, aiming to raise the welfare of 
the working class not through collective actions (like trade unions) but by providing 
individual opportunities. The right (in other sources: national) idea implies a commitment 
to collective emancipation, assuming that socio-economic emancipatory efforts will prove 
to be a failure without securing and enforcing the rights and interests of communities as 
entities. From this perspective, the left-liberal versus right cleavage of Hungarian high 
politics can be interpreted as a duel for primacy between collectivist and individualist 
emancipatory notions. This original dispute around the primacy of notions propounds the 
theoretical possibility of their synchronizing, when evolving simultaneously, or even 
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underpinning each other. (See John Stuart Mill’s thoughts in “On Liberty” or Rousseau’s 
“Consideration on the Government of Poland,” for whom the national framework of 
societies was regarded as necessary for the fulfilment of individual liberties: Özkirimli, 
2000. Among Hungarian political thinkers, István Bibó’s oeuvre can be interpreted in a 
similar way: Bibó 1990; Fricz 1990.)
Nonetheless, in several historical situations, a contradiction has been encountered 
between the two notions, with the counter-idea experienced not as underpinning but 
as hampering, which leads to a discourse of binary dichotomy. Such exclusively indivi-
dualistic or collectivist worldviews, institutionalized into a strong dichotomy, are also 
described as modernism and traditionalism within academic literature. This pair of 
concepts is used seemingly rarely in Hungarian scholarship, perhaps because significant 
collectivist streams have proved to be pro-change, according to which social progress is 
desirable, but within certain traditional (national) frameworks, and counting together 
with other national counter-interests (as a “progress with preserving,” Ormos 2013). 
However, we consider the use of this pair of concepts also to be appropriate as 
elucidating a discourse evolved around the contesting ideas, separating and delegiti-
mizing each other, thus institutionalizing an essentially universal dichotomy and fram-
ing it within a globally comprehensible context. From this aspect, modernism is the 
spread of the Weberian Gesellschaft at the expense of the Gemeinschaft (Dewey, 1960; 
Schnaiberg, 1970).
Hungarian failures in synchronizing individualist and collectivist 
emancipation
Meanwhile, Hungarian ethnic society in the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy seemed to be excellently positioned from the aspect of political power com-
pared to the surrounding non-Hungarians (Ormos 2013). Political culture had to face a 
deep crisis, i.e. the collapse of nineteenth-century “national liberalism,” a political program 
merging individualist and collective emancipation. Hungarian national liberalism of the 
nineteenth century had just become gradually aware of the growing self-contradiction 
that liberalism could have implied the emancipation of non-Hungarian citizens through 
political democratization, undermining the room for manoeuvre for the society as a whole 
(Dénes 2006). The author of the Hungarian anthem during the Vormärz could honestly 
form the mission of this epoch in the slogan “Homeland and progress.” As time passed by 
and national movements within the Carpathian basin begun to rise, the contradiction 
between individual progress and collectivist notions about homeland became increas-
ingly apparent. National liberalism, which had been the leading idea behind Hungarian 
political movements in the nineteenth century, was fading away until its party proxies 
collapsed spectacularly in the dawn of the twentieth century (Horváth and Techet 2012; 
Gerő 2000). This silent crisis can be regarded as the historical basis of the modernism– 
traditionalism dichotomy.
Further developments did not diminish but reinforced this evolving dichotomy, since 
the Treaty of Trianon was constituted by the Western powers, the representative of social 
progress and modernization. It seriously hampered the identification of collectivist eman-
cipation – e.g. minority rights issues or sovereignty issues like claims against the economic 
and political isolation of the country – with Westernization, despite some inspiring 
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aspirations for a Hungary-Entente reconciliation in foreign policy during the 1920s; these 
attempts were fuelled by the expectation that revision of borders could be achieved even 
with the support of the Entente powers (Romsics 2010). Yet, the interwar regime began to 
drift towards the Nazi-Fascist axis powers and eventually aimed at resolving the question 
of the state borders with overt anti-Western (Nazi and Fascist) political assistance 
(Ablonczy 2018).
Moreover, domestic socio-economic developments had also bolstered a tradition-
alism–modernism value dilemma, when the flourishing urban middle-class lifestyle 
was opposed to rural agony. Such a dichotomy was not exceptional at that time, as 
perceived and discussed worldwide at least in the language of the arts. In Hungary, the 
opposition was sharpened through political and public practices which are called 
“groupism” by Brubaker (2002): since the urban middle-class included a significant 
bourgeoisie of Jewish-origin, modern urban culture became synonymous with 
“Jewish-like” culture (Gyáni 2010). In contrast, a “völkisch” cultural stream, opposed 
to urbanism and focusing on the sociographic mapping of traditional rural commu-
nities, had been poisoned with accusations of being antisemitic.11 This process of 
ethnic groupism along the modernism–traditionalism axis was largely boosted and 
manifested by the political regime as well through rhetoric (the accusation of 
Budapest “betraying the homeland”) and through legal steps like maximizing the 
number of Jewish students in higher education. And when revisionism – a kind of 
practical implementation of collective emancipation – proceeded between 1938 and 
1941, a considerable number of citizens – of Jewish origin – encountered the total 
nullification of the century-long results of their individual emancipation. The dichot-
omy between individualism and collectivism was sharpened and over-exacerbated 
directly by political structures.
During the ensuing Communist decades, the perceived dichotomy between individu-
alism and collectivism was fuelled both by the rhetoric and the political behaviour of the 
state regime. The national interest – in the form that it had been conceptualized in the 
interwar period – was interpreted as obsolete and bourgeois, something which hampered 
social progression and modernization. And meanwhile, the post-1956 political elite 
opened up the possibility of individual welfare (like possessing a car or cottage, travelling 
abroad, permitting the entry of Western cultural products), while the situation of some 
previously existing collective entities – village communities after the nationalization of 
land, religious communities after persecution – remained degraded (Romsics 2010; Rainer 
M., 2012, calling it “welfare socialism”). The degraded position of Hungary as a political 
entity remained also taboo, regarding issues like the minority rights of Hungarians living 
abroad, relations with the Soviet Union, or economic exposure through the toxic over- 
indebtedness of the state budget. From this perspective, “Goulash Communism” can be 
regarded as an experiment of individual emancipation at the expense of eliminating 
collective and national interests (Tokes 1996; Szalai et al. 2003).
These historical milestones outlined above seem to be principal in opposing individual 
and collectivist emancipatory ideas to each other along the modernism–traditionalism 
value choice dilemma, materializing their confrontation as a zero-sum-game between 
contesting notions. In the dawn of Hungarian democracy, the modernist-traditionalist 
value choice dilemma, latently existing even under Communism, could be presented 
overtly: ideological conflicts sparked off a Kulturkampf just as if Communism had not tried 
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to suppress plural ideological narratives in the preceding 40 years. Not just political 
parties but media actors – TVs, newspapers and periodicals – and even cultural organiza-
tions positioned themselves along this cleavage, already becoming reproducers of this 
dichotomy (György 2001).
After the fall of Communism, three decades could have proved to be enough for 
neutralizing value dilemmas, particularly if lacking manifest conflict of material interests. 
Three interpretations can explain the failure of such hopes and the strength of path- 
dependent polarization. The “economic” (rational choice) theory of the development of 
political culture (Downs 1957) argues that centrist society becomes more centrist, while 
polarized society becomes more polarized – political supply reinforces political demand. 
Hungarian political research data could confirm this process. Besides, the activism of 
combatant Hungarian cultural elites – maybe too influential (Schlett 1995) – seems also 
to be decisive in the contention between “modernist” and “traditional” attitudes. Thirdly, a 
relatively new phenomenon – but particularly worth investigating – is that opposing 
discursive streams have been reproduced in an increasingly formal way, lacking earlier 
intellectual content. A parallel can be drawn with the “discursive formation” of national 
identities born in conflicts, whose principal argument for their own existence is prone to be 
the existence of others (Calhoun 1997). In the case of Hungary, this discursive formation – 
implying a “symbolic thickening” (Kotwas and Kubik 2019) of discourses and a deflation of 
content – seems to be strengthened by an intellectual fatigue as well. Post-1989 men of 
letters can seemingly lack the interwar intellectuals’ interest in or ability to demarcate from 
extreme rhetoric and seek common substance with others (Ablonczy 2016). As a result, the 
binary dichotomy of values has gained its own symbolic topics (Trianon, revisionism; 
permitting or prohibiting the erection of a sculpture to Horthy; usage or prohibition of 
the red star; etc.) within Hungarian public discourse, and what is more important, its own 
lingo, known by politically indifferent and rather passive layers as well.12
Eventually, “homeland” and “progression” as ideational forms have been filled with the 
denotation of exclusivity against each other: as a political analyst pointed out, “with the 
exception of rare occasions . . . these two principles could be effective on the expense of 
each other, against each other” (Márkus 2009, 127). Moreover, the polarization of dis-
course has led to the split of traditionalism into a “traditional traditionalist” stream (not 
giving up the substance of Europeanization and the “convergence dream”) and into a 
neo-traditionalist stream (the “new Right”) in post-crisis Hungary, questioning already the 
essence of Westernization, and trying to offer some neo-traditional, neo-feudal, or neo- 
Byzantine alternative (Ágh 2019; Kollai 2020). This neo-traditional stream could gain a 
decisive influence within the Hungarian right-wing political arena, backed by the govern-
ment parties’ “divide et impera” tactics and by their polarizing mechanisms. Old Hungarian 
traditionalism – filled with the “convergence” dream and inspirations for Europeanization 
– has become the new centre, facing the historical fate of Hungarian centrism, i.e. 
hollowing out (see Table 2).13
Table 2. Polarization of Hungarian political culture and the birth of “new right.”
Left-liberal “Old right” “New right”
Idealized society Modern Modern Traditional
Primacy in human emancipation Individual Collective Collective
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Collective and individual emancipation in Slovakia: a latent confluence
Just like some layers of Hungarian political culture, the attitude of Slovak voters can also 
be partly interpreted in a longue durée perspective. The era of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy (1867–1918) exposed Slovak intellectuals to a two-fold trauma: the trauma of 
lacking collective (national) as well as individual (welfare) emancipation (Zajac 1997). This 
implied a natural cross-fertilization between ideas on social and national progression: as 
Dušan Kováč, a leading personality of Slovak academic life, concluded, national agitation 
in the era of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy went hand-in-hand with social agitation and 
contributed to the democratization of political agendas: “Principles of national conscious-
ness and civic rights existed beside each other in national programmes” (Kováč 2009, 273– 
274). Even the thinkers who were being critical towards nation-building and ethnocentric 
elitism had to confront their ideas with their own elementary claim for national survival. 
Under the pressure of this conflict of interests and ideas, intellectuals critical towards 
traditionalism, like Samuel Štefanovič and Ján Lajčiak, chose the enforced path of volun-
tary solitude (Chmel 1975). It did not mean a total lack of modernization-traditionalism 
debates within Slovak public discourse. Nevertheless, these debates had a limited socio- 
cultural influence, lacking the symbolism which today’s Slovak society could remember 
and reproduce, and being constrained by the general idea of transforming an ethnic- 
cultural minority into a nation. It is the reason why Tibor Pichler calls this debate, a kind of 
“Kulturkampf within Slovak nationalism,” within which the idea of “individualistic nation- 
building was a stance which did not lead further” (Pichler 2011, 93–95, 99, 108).14
This political culture was fuelled further by an under-urbanized elite where thoughts of 
modernization came partly from rural cultural cores (Zajac 1997). For instance, as a 
symptomatic case, the aforementioned Ján Lajčiak moved from the metropolis of 
Budapest – a symbolic place of assimilation of Slovaks, to a little Northern-Slovak village 
in the Liptov region to complete his work (see the thesis of “village, as a counter-pole” 
from Škvarna 2001). The most influential and vivid hub of Slovak public life was the tiny 
town of Martin at that time, one of the smallest county centres of historical Hungary. After 
World War I, this rural intelligentsia had a chance of “nationalizing” the towns and cities, 
meanwhile shaping their urban atmosphere according to their customs. As a result, the 
dawning Slovak urban spaces were not distant from the rural atmosphere, and a poiso-
nous rural-urban tension was not dominant there. A “rural urbanism” triumphed instead. 
As the renowned Slovak historian Dušan Škvarna concludes, the modern Slovak culture 
and consciousness were constituted on “strong plebeian features, conservative princi-
ples” even compared to surrounding countries (Škvarna 2001).15
Moreover, Communism in Slovakia – unlike in Hungary – has not sparked a moder-
nization-traditionalism cleavage. The early communist decades were perceived as 
bringing about a “civilization boom,” and this perception was engrained deeply into 
ensuing generations’ public remembrance as well. According to contemporary surveys, 
80% of Slovakian respondents assess the consequences of collectivization positively; 
73% of them associate it with an increasing standard of living in rural areas and 69% 
with cultural development (Pekník 2006, 38). This modernization was propagated with 
an anti-liberal air, which resulted in an atypical disharmony between modernization 
and liberal values (Škvarna 2001, 261). Even the post-1968 epoch of Czechoslovakian 
communism was not saturated with such dividing remembrance-debates as in the 
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Czech Republic, because the repression of the Prague Spring (“normalization”) was 
coupled with reorganization of the twin-country into a federative model. It is not a 
coincidence that more than two-thirds of contemporary Slovaks regard these decades 
as an opportunity for national emancipation against the Czechs, and as the age of a 
developing self-consciousness with a stronger Slovak political presence in the state 
bodies (Pekník 2006, 52). It is also not a coincidence that Red Army monuments, 
symbols of repression in other Central European countries, have not disappeared 
utterly in Slovakia, and still constitute a considerable part of all military monuments 
(Bartlová 2007, 158).
Approaching the end of the twentieth-century history of Slovakia, the question can be 
raised again: do the political tendencies of bygone decades, fading away into far history, 
indicate a direct explanation for the attitude of contemporary voters? The answer lies – as 
above, in the subsection on Hungarian attitudes – in the important roles of institutions 
maintaining and reinforcing voters’ habits. A weakly ideologized political culture con-
tributed to the dawn of the rainbow-coalition in 1998, embracing rural conservatives 
(KDH), social-democrats (SDL) and market-oriented Christian democrats (SDKU) a political 
formation which – with some amendments in 2002 – could lay down the path of Slovakia 
into NATO and the EU, and eventually into the Euro-zone (Bútora 1997). Hence, a cultural 
code of “rural urbanism” and “traditional modernism” materialized in concrete political 
and public outcomes. Leading media actors, like SME and týždeň, were impregnated with 
the same ideological confluences, shaping the habit of readers’ community further in this 
direction.
Through EU-accession, Slovakia reached a well-materialized threshold of the national- 
social emancipation idea, whose century-long narrative seemed to have come to its end. 
However, although the “rainbow coalition” could come to power once again in 2010, this 
political constellation quickly fell apart, partly due to ideological duels between pro- 
marijuana, anti-abortion and other factions. Conservative journalists abandoned the 
weekly týždeň in order to establish an outspoken Christian-conservative media outlet. 
The lack of ideological cleavages has not meant lack of cleavages at all; but they are 
rooted rather in contemporary debates and scandals instead of fierce residual cultural 
debates, sparkling rootless ad-hoc movements and anti-politics against politics, which has 
contributed to the emergence of one of the most peculiar political scenes of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the last decade.
Criticism towards Kampf and phlegm in political culture
Since the Slovak and Hungarian value orientations, as cultural codes, have manifold 
effects on society, economy, culture, and politics, their parallel analysis should not 
result in their normative judgement or ranking. Seen purely from the perspective of 
the room of manoeuvre for civic activism, Hungarian polarization and politicization 
create more jeopardies through the political labelling of new initiatives (Márkus 2009, 
125).16 Anyway, the attitude of both Slovak and Hungarian voters is under academic or 
public criticism in both countries. In Hungary, a plethora of critical judgements of the 
above-depicted ideological division can be found in pamphlets, essays, analyses from 
contemporary literary to political science, producing strikingly similar conclusions. 
Péter Eszterházy was a renowned Hungarian writer, speaks about the over- 
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politicization of public and private spaces: political ideologies’ “natural rules and 
reflexes predominate everywhere” (Eszterházy 2018). This is close to the thought of 
political researchers who are also liable to assess negatively the Hungarian “self-over-
appreciating” or “over-powerful” feature of political ideologies, causing the predomi-
nance of parties (partocracy), where public opinion is not capable of constraining the 
power of politics (Fricz 1998; Susánszky, Unger, and Kopper).17
The Slovak intelligentsia is also critical towards their political climate. Drawing from 
these sources, the weak ideological content of public discourse tends to be referred to as 
just an unintentional side-effect of a general “social detachment/unconcern” which is 
denominated as the leading Slovak cultural code by many authors. For instance, the 
renowned public author Martin M. Šimečka calls it the “code of detachment” or “uncon-
cern,” tracing it to the mountainous home of the Slovaks, as a common secret habit. 
Interestingly enough, an academic analysis points out this phenomenon with the same 
attribute, tracing back the growing number of “unconcerned citizens” to the socio- 
culturally dependent situation of Slovakia in a longue durée perspective: “until the fall of 
Communism, our citizens could not assess either politics or history or their real circum-
stances by themselves, on their own” (Plávková 2017, 21–22). With a little malice, the 
contemporary Slovak author Pavel Vilikovský says that Slovak society is “doomed to 
eternal innocence” (Vilikovský 1997). Oľga Gyárfášová describes it as an “anti-heroic 
historical consciousness,” where members of society have engrained “in their cultural 
codes that their fate was described by others” (Gyárfášová 2014, 447). Others are not so 
permissive: Daniel Pastirčák speaks about “annoying cultural nihilism” which is utilized 
and reproduced by politics (Pastirčák 2013, 479), Milan Šútovec writes about the “absurd 
goulash of values” (cited by Bútora 1997 without reference to the source), Pavol Lukáč, an 
academic researcher on Slovak post-Communist political thinking, defined it as the 
provinciality of Slovak elites (Lukáč 2007, 339).
The archetypes of Slovak and Hungarian political attitudes can be associated with 
situations depicted in the classical work of Lipset and Rokkan, who argue for the crucial 
influence of an inertial system of cleavages in political structures (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967). If cleavages have arisen about pragmatic questions (around “profane” themes) and 
intercept each other, they eliminate each other’s’ dividing effect. If cleavages have been 
created around cultural-ideological (“sacralized”) questions, and they do not intercept 
each other, but culminate, divided political “lagers” will be born.
Hungarian behaviour is close to the Rokkanian theory on congested cleavages, or to 
the overburdened state described by Claus Offe, where the binary dichotomy of enemy- 
ally, we-they oppositions rules political culture, making cooperation and compromises 
impossible (Offe 1991). The evolution of Slovak political attitudes has its own international 
context as well, described by Peter Mair as a post-communist phenomenon, rooted in a 
kind of civilization incompetence and embodied in the instability of voters and in the 
cacophony of political entrepreneurs.
To recapitulate the findings above, I scrutinized the differing development of the 
“ideological atmosphere” within Slovak and Hungarian societies during the twentieth 
century which allows me to draw the conclusion that bygone political milestones, pre-
vious political milestones and tendencies have greatly influenced the basic habits of the 
voters in both societies. During the last century, Hungarian political culture has encoun-
tered historical situations which have strengthened antagonism between national and 
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individual emancipatory ideas, formulating it within a traditionalism–modernism dis-
course. This division has been strongly influenced not by politicians but by the cultural 
elites’ ideological duels; meanwhile in Slovakia, such ideologically oriented public dis-
course has never become predominant. The result is that Hungarian society is marked by 
a strong ideological dichotomy, which lowers the public demand for un-categorizable 
civil initiatives. In turn, the Slovak society is characterized by weak ideological strands, 
giving room for civic voices, but for political entrepreneurs as well.
As a recapitulation, it is worth emphasizing that contemporary political culture is not 
the direct result of previous decades’ historical events and socio-cultural tendencies; there 
is no genetics in political culture (Kubik 2018). Moreover, all the historical milestones from 
regime changes to democratic elections could be an occasion for resetting the contours 
of the public sphere. Nevertheless, institutions of political culture in a broad sense (rules 
and organizations, attitudes, customs) cannot be under-estimated in handing over old 
cultural codes to new generations; they are partially products of past cleavages, while 
simultaneously serving as reproducers of political attitudes.
Notes
1. In Slovakia, local elections [komunálne volby] have been arranged every four years: after the 
local elections held in November 2014, the next occasion took place in November 2018. 
Similarly, Hungary had local elections [önkormányzati választások] in autumn 2014, but due 
to new regulations, the next elections were held just in 2019, since the local councils’ term in 
government has been prolonged from four to five years. In Hungary: “Act 2013/L on the 
election of local council members and mayors.” In Slovakia: “Act 346/1990 on elections of 
municipalities’ local governments”. Election laws have not been developing in a considerably 
different way: citizens can vote for local council members and mayors as well, while inhabi-
tants of capital cities have right to elect mayors of districts and a capital city mayor (senior 
mayor) as well.
2. Apart from debates in the international academic literature, an interesting example of this 
dilemma was produced in Slovakia where some anti-government civil protesters of Spring 
2018 (“For a righteous Slovakia”) decided to be engaged in the forthcoming municipal 
elections. Reactions were quite arborescent and contradictory. See the debate on it in the 
newspaper Denník N. E.g. Konštantín Čikovský: Za slušné Slovensko šíri nebezpečný blud 
oškodlivosti politických strán. Denník N, 2. July 2018. https://dennikn.sk/1168849/za-slusne- 
slovensko-siri-nebezpecny-blud-o-skodlivosti-politickych-stran/(Date of download: 30 July 
2018.)
3. See the data of the European Value Study (’Which party appeals to you most?’ On a left-right 
scale) or the European Social Survey (’Where would you place yourself on a left-right scale?’).
4. Körösényi’s essay refers to an international comparison, according to which Hungary pro-
duced one of the biggest levels of ideological polarization among the 19 countries covered in 
the research.
5. In the second broad coalition (2002–2006), the earlier left-wing party the SDL – after 
falling out of parliament – was replaced by the liberal ANO, which led to this second 
coalition being considered by some researchers as already being a right-wing-oriented 
coalition.
6. The coalition governing during the 2016–2020 term consisted of three parliamentary parties. 
On a European level, the leading Smer-SD belongs to the “Group of the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists and Democrats”, meanwhile “Most-Híd” is a member of the European People’s 
Party. Between 2009 and 2014, when the third governing force (Slovak National Party) was 
represented by one MEP in the European Parliament, they joined the radical, UKIP-led club 
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“Europe of Freedom and Democracy”. See the website of the European Parliament (http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en), and the website of the MEP of the Slovak National Party 
(http://www.jaroslav-paska.sk).
7. Našu frustráciu preháňame [We exaggerate our frustration]. Interview with Martin M. 
Šimečka. týždeň, 10. január 2010 https://www.tyzden.sk/casopis/5949/nasu-frustraciu-preha 
name/Šimečka: SME nehľadá pravdu [Šimečka: Daily SME does not seek the truth]. SME 
Online, 14.January2013 https://domov.sme.sk/c/6667070/simecka-sme-nehlada-pravdu.html
8. Peter Zajac served as an MP from 2010–2012, representing a small pro-American neo- 
conservative party in the Slovak parliament. František Mikloško is a mediatized symbol of 
the Slovak Christian-democrat movement. Andrej Bán and Lucia Piussi are committed 
representatives of the idea of an open society. https://www.tyzden.sk/info/vseobecne/o- 
nas/
9. Pál Szombathy: A tizenegy évvel ezelőtti események másik olvasata. [Another narrative of the 
events 11 years before.] Mandiner, 5 November 2016. https://media.mandiner.hu/cikk/ 
20161105_szombathy_pal_a_tizenegy_evvel_ezelotti_esemenyek_masik_olvasata
10. Campaign website of the Politis.hu: https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/politis-hu-kell-egy- 
ujsag#/
11. Völkisch thoughts were originally conceptualized as being opposed against the German 
presence as well. According to them, the Ottoman conquest in Hungary (beginning with 
the battle of Mohács in 1526) was not the main tragedy of the country, it just diverted 
attention from the German-Habsburg colonization (Szabó 1939; Németh 1989). Völkish men 
of letters had renewed the research into Hungarian agrarianism in the interwar period, but 
interpreted this rural world as a counterpart to the “Westerners”.
12. As an example of its poisoning effect, see the debates between Hungarian historians over the 
question of the traumatic weight and role of Trianon and the shoah (Kovács 2015).
13. This process can be traced back through the pages of the periodical Kommentár, taken over 
by the ’new Right’ in 2014, and sparked off a debate among pro-Westerners and neo- 
traditionalists, who claim to be the ’right conservatives’.
14. Tibor Pichler refers to the works of Bohdan Pavlů on “conservative and progressive nation-
alism” as well. Pichler claimed that “the prerequisite of national development is the political 
freedom, democracy” (Pichler 2011, 99).
15. On the nationalization of non-Slovak urban spaces, see Gašpar (1969). The above-cited Tibor 
Pichler refers to Dominik Tatarka – a leading personality of dissidents during Communism 
and a common ideological reference of post-1989 politics – as an “urban ruralist” (Pichler 
2006).
16. According to Márkus, “the culture-based policy, deforming into a Kulturkampf” hampered 
rational and cooperative political acting and caused the suboptimal economic performance 
of Hungary.
17. Fricz warns about the practice of “democracy without citizens”, without a civil voice (Fricz 
1998, 72). See the universal model of partocracy, or “over-particization” in Ágh (1998).
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